Summit Water Distribution Company v. Mountain Regional Special Service District: Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
Summit Water Distribution Company v. Mountain
Regional Special Service District: Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert S. Campbell; Scott M. Lilja; Clark K. Taylor; VanCott Bagley Cornwall and McCarthy;
Attorneys for Appellants.
Jody K. Burnett, Robert C. Keller; Williams and Hunt; Andrew M. Morse; Snow Christensen and
Martineau; Attorneys for Appellees.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Summit Water Distribution Company v. Mountain Regional Special, No. 20040091 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4788
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SUMMIT WATER DISTRIBUTION 
COMPANY, et al. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
MOUNTAIN REGIONAL SPECIAL 
SERVICE DISTRICT, et al. 
Defendants/Appellees. 
APPELLEES' BRIEF 
Case No. 20040091-CA 
Oral Argument Priority No. 15 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SUMMIT COUNTY, 
HONORABLE BRUCE C. LUBECK, DISTRICT JUDGE 
Robert S. Campbell (0557) 
Scott M. Lilja (4231) 
Clark K. Taylor (5354) 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY CORNWALL & 
MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0340 
Telephone: 801-532-3333 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Summit Water, et al. 
Jody K Burnett (0499) 
Robert C. Keller (4861) 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Telephone: 801-521-5678 
Attorneys for Mountain Regional 
Defendants/Appellees 
Andrew M. Morse (4498) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & 
MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: 801-521-9000 
Attorneys for Administrative 
Defendants/Appellees ciiFD 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
AUG \ 8 2Q(N 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SUMMIT WATER DISTRIBUTION 
COMPANY, et al. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
MOUNTAIN REGIONAL SPECIAL 
SERVICE DISTRICT, et al. 
Defendants/Appellees. 
APPELLEES' BRIEF 
Case No. 20040091-CA 
Oral Argument Priority No. 15 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SUMMIT COUNTY, 
HONORABLE BRUCE C. LUBECK, DISTRICT JUDGE 
Robert S. Campbell (0557) 
Scott M. Lilja (4231) 
Clark K. Taylor (5354) 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY CORNWALL & 
MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0340 
Telephone: 801-532-3333 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Summit Water, et al. 
Jody K Burnett (0499) 
Robert C. Keller (4861) 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P. O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Telephone: 801-521-5678 
Attorneys for Mountain Regional 
Defendants/Appellees 
Andrew M. Morse (4498) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & 
MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: 801-521-9000 
Attorneys for Administrative 
Defendants/Appellees 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below. 2 
B. Reply to Appellants' Statement of Facts 9 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 10 
ARGUMENT 11 
POINT I 
SUMMIT WATER'S ARGUMENT THAT ORDINANCE 436 
WAS NOT ENACTED UNDER AUTHORITY GRANTED BY 
CLUDMA IS WITHOUT BASIS IN FACT OR IN LAW 11 
POINT n 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED SUMMIT 
WATER'S COMPLAINT SEEKING MANDAMUS RELIEF 
BECAUSE SUMMIT WATER HAD OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY 
AND ADEQUATE REMEDIES 19 
CONCLUSION 21 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 
2003 UT 16, U 12; 70 P3d 47 1 
Brantley Farms v. Carlsbad Irr. Dist., 
954 P.2d 763 (N.M. App. 1998) 19 
Cache County v. Property Div. of die Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
922 P.2d 758 (Utah 1996) 1 
Cherokee Water & Sanitation Dist. v. El Paso County, 
770 P.2d 1339 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) 17 
Crestview-HoUaday Homeowners Ass'n v. Engh Floral Co., 
545 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1976) 15 
Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 
358 P.2d 633 (Utah 1961) 1, 14 
Hatch v. Utah County Planning Dep't., 
685 P.2d 550 (Utah 1984) 20 
Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., 
392 P.2d 40 (Utah 1964) 20 
Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 
659 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1983) 20 
Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
410 P.2d 764, 765 (Utah 1966) 14 
Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 
904 P.2d 677 (Utah 1995) 20 
State v. Ruggeri, 
429 P2d 969 (Utah 1967) 20 
Toone v. Weber County, 
2 0 0 2 ? T n n i r i ' r . . . . . ' . . ' . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
Wright Development v. City of" Wdlsvillc, 
608 P.2d 232 (Utah 1980) 20, 21 
Statutes and Rules 
Summit Con i it HJI;I«MV - ' , , ' •. . . i, o 
±00 ' , . 3, 6 
Summit Comity Ordinance No. 415 • o 
Summit County Ordinance No. 436 1 "* 4 1 ? ] : ?-• 
TT
* \ o u t . \ i iwia lcu i- i ~ 
, j O 17 
b u m Code Annotated § 1," 2 / 1 0 0 1 > > 20 
U u h Code- Annotated § 17-27-101 1 4 i . .. -^ A) 
Utah Code Annotat ed § 1 : Z : ] 02 ' ' 
Cu l i I .MI< /uiiKPr.ih-tl *'. I " v ' ?»(»! x 
Utah Code Annotated § 17-27-302 1 7 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 ' ' 1 
i t iii Rules of Civil Procedure., Ri i le 1 2 ( , 
1 it a I: :i K i ] les of Civi I Pi ocedi :i re, B i : i 1 ::: 65B ±{J 
Other 
Adam Mrachan. Concura*iicy I ,aws: Water as a La i id I Ise Regulation, 
* j j I .:• )-.\ Resources & Envtl. Law, 451, 452 16 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As appropriately restated, this appeal presents the following issue: 
Whether the district court correctly determined that Summit County 
considered Ordinance 436 necessary for the use and development of land within the 
County so as to be authorized by the County Land Use Development and Management 
Act ("CLUDMA"), and subject to CLUDMA's time limitations and standards of review. 
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which this Court reviews for 
correctness. Cache County v. Property Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n. 922 P.2d 
758, 766 (Utah 1996). However, Summit County's legislative acts and the legislative 
findings supporting them are presumed correct, "it is 'the court's duty to resolve all doubts 
in favor3 of the municipality and the burden is on the plaintiff challenging a municipal 
land use decision to show that the municipal action was clearly beyond the [County's] 
power." Bradley v. Payson City Corp.. 2003 UT 16, 11 12; 70 P.3d 47 quoting Gayland 
v. Salt Lake County 358 P.2d 633, 636 (Utah 1961). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION, 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES 
1. County Land Use Development and Management Act, Utah Code 
Annotated §§ 17-27-101 (Short tide), 17-27-102 (Purpose), 17-27-301 (General plan), 
17-27-401 (General powers), 17-27-1001(2)(a)(Appeals). 
2. Rule 65B(a) and (d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (governing actions for 
extraordinary relief). 
3. Summit County Ordinance No. 436.l 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below. 
In an attempt to accommodate accelerated development that was threatening the 
available supply of safe culinary water and the capacity of certain smaller water companies 
within the Snyderville Basin to meet their contractual commitments to supply water, 
beginning in 2000 Summit County undertook a coordinated program: (i) to establish a 
public culinary water distribution system through the use of a water special service district 
to take the place of a collection of small, inadequately financed private companies (R. at 
8); and (ii) to implement through its zoning powers a mechanism for rating the capacity 
of both public and private culinary water companies in the County to assure that those 
accepting new residential customers had the ability to deliver the actual "wet" water which 
they had committed to provide. (R. at 8-9.) 
Pursuant to these efforts, on November 14, 2002, the Summit County Commission 
adopted Ordinance 436. (Compl. Ex. 1, R. at 27-52.) In support of the Ordinance, the 
commission made certain legislative findings as follows: 
. . . the 2000 water year was very dry and the drought has continued into 
the 2002 water year resulting in several water systems within the Snyderville Basin 
experiencing water source deficiencies and/or a loss of water quality thereby 
affecting the ability of the water systems to provide adequate water service to 
existing connections or to permit new connections to be made to the water 
systems; and, 
1
 The statutes referenced here are set forth in their entirety in the Addendum, with 
the exception of Summit County Ordinance No. 436, which is attached to the Appellants3 
Brief as Attachment No. 2. 
. . . other shortages of water experienced during the summer of 2000, were 
caused by poor water system management decisions and by well failures and other 
causes reasonably beyond the control of water system management; and, 
. . . the random shortages experienced could have been lessened, to some 
extent, if the Basin's water distribution systems had been interconnected and a 
management vehicle had been in place to facilitate the sharing of available surplus 
water resources among the various suppliers of drinking water; and, 
. . . the County adopted an emergency Ordinance No. 385, on May 15, 
2000, known as the Concurrency Ordinance, which imposed temporary zoning 
regulations on the western side of Summit County that tied development approvals 
and the issuance of building permits to the availability of water, and the County 
adopted Ordinance No. 400, perpetuating the concurrency requirement of the 
temporary zoning ordinance; and, 
, . . Ordinance 400 in its application required the issuance of Water 
Concurrency Letters as a condition to obtaining a building permit, and the Water 
Concurrency Letter had a duration of up to one year, and did not require the 
Water Suppliers to make a permanent commitment and allocation of water to lot 
purchasers, thereby creating uncertainty as to whether a lot purchaser had the right 
to connect and receive water service, or whether there would be water available for 
the water company to provide service, which had the effect of placing the 
regulatory burden of Water Suppliers not meeting the demands of their service area 
on lot owners rather than on the Water Suppliers; and, 
. . . neither the Division of Drinking Water nor the County have in the past 
had the staff resources and funding available to provide more than an initial 
feasibility review of a Water Supplier's water system and appurtenances and no 
continuing periodic monitoring has been performed to ensure Water Suppliers3 
continued ability to meet the service demands of its system; and, 
. . . the County strongly believes that new growth should not occur unless 
the Water Supplier who will serve the new growth can demonstrate that it can and 
will have the ability to develop the physical resources to provide the anticipated 
service; and 
. . . the County believes that building permits should not be issued for new 
construction unless the physical water supply then currently exists to serve the new 
connection, and that once a commitment for service is given by a Water Supplier 
that it should be irrevocable to protect the property owner's ability to obtain water 
service and to preserve the marketability of the property; and 
. . . the Board of County Commissioners is authorized pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 17-27-101, et seq., as amended, to adopt an ordinance 
establishing these zoning regulations; and 
. . . the Board of County Commissioners finds that there is a compelling, 
countervailing public interest to properly regulate development in areas that are, or 
may be, adversely impacted by water source capacity. 
(R. at 27-29.) 
Based on these findings, Ordinance 436 requires, inter alia, that: (i) before a 
developer receives plat approval or building permits from the County, the developer have a 
letter issued by a water company within the County indicating the water company's 
willingness and commitment to supply water (R. at 38-40); (ii) water companies 
supplying development within the County submit an annual Supply/Demand Study and 
five-year forecast (R. at 42-48); and (iii) through an Interlocal Cooperation Agreement 
with the Utah Department of Environmental Quality there is appointed a District 
Engineer who evaluates the Supply/Demand Studies submitted by the water companies, 
and certifies the studies to the Summit County Health Director, who must, in turn, 
approve or reject each Water Demand Study in writing after certification by the District 
Engineer. (R. at 33-34, 42-48.) 
Ordinance 436 further provides an administrative appeal process to persons 
aggrieved by any decision rendered under the Ordinance: 
Peer Review. If the Director rejects a Supply/Demand Study based upon the 
recommendations of the District Engineer, or if the Water Supplier or any 
Customer on the Water Supplier's distribution system disputes any conclusions of 
the District Engineer in his or her certification to the County, the concerned party 
may request Peer Review of the District Engineer's findings and conclusions. 
iii. The decision of the Peer Reviewer will be issued within 15 working 
days of the submittal of the contested Supply/Demand Study and the 
District Engineer's conclusions to the Peer Reviewer. 
iv. The Director of Health shall then act upon the recommendations of 
the Peer Reviewer and either approve or reject the annual Supply/Demand 
Study based upon that recommendation. 
Appeal of a Decision of the Summit County Director of Health. The decision of 
the Director shall be deemed the final action of Summit County. Any party 
aggrieved by a decision of the Director under this Ordinance may seek judicial 
review in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
(R. at 47.) CLUDMA, referenced in the findings of Ordinance 436, provides, in turn, 
that: 
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the 
exercise of or in violation of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition 
for review of the decision with the district court within 30 days after the 
local decision is rendered. 
(3)(a) The courts shall: 
(i) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; 
and 
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal. 
(b) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the 
decision violates a statute, ordinance, or existing law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001. 
By way of a Petition for Review pursuant to § 17-27-1001, Plaintiffs and 
Appellants Summit Water Distribution Company, a private, purportedly non-profit water 
company that sells culinary water within Summit County, and its owners (collectively 
"Summit Water35), have previously sued the County and challenged the application of the 
precursor water concurrency ordinances, Ordinances 385, 400 and 415. (Rl at 28-29.)2 
However, in the Complaint subject to this appeal, Summit Water did not name Summit 
County, and did not pose any challenge to Ordinance 436 nor make any allegations 
concerning its validity under CLUDMA. (R. at 1-26.) 
Rather, in this action, Summit Water sued Mountain Regional Water Special 
Service District, the water special service district established by the County, and its officers 
and directors, including the Board of County Commissioners as its governing board 
(collectively "MRSSD"). (R. at 1.) Summit Water also sued the District Engineer and 
County Health Director (collectively the "Administrative Defendants35).3 (R. at 1.) 
Essentially, Summit Water alleged: (i) that the MRSSD Water Demand Study submitted 
on January 31, 2003, was based on false and fraudulent data, and contained false and 
fraudulent statements and information (R. at 12 -18); (ii) that the Administrative 
2Summit Water's challenge to Summit County's actions on antitrust grounds was 
also dismissed by the district court, and is subject to another appeal pending in this Court, 
Summit Water Distribution Co., et al. v. Summit County et aL Case No. 20040033-CA. 
3MRSSD and the Administrative Defendants were and are represented by different 
counsel. However, in light of the disposition of the case in the district court, they join in 
this single Appellees5 Brief to jointly address all issues Summit Water raised on appeal. 
Defendants approved and certified most, but not all, of the study on March 3 and 4, 2003, 
thereby rating MRSSD for a greater capacity than it otherwise should have had (R. at 22); 
and (iii) that Summit Water was aggrieved by these circumstances because MRSSD's 
rating affected Summit Water's "competitive position" in the Summit County water 
market. (R. at 24-27.) 
As the vehicle for its Complaint, Summit Water relied upon "Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 65B(a) & (d) or otherwise," and for its "Cause[s] of Action," asserted that: 
(i) the Court should "mandatorily order [MRSSD] to file a true, accurate, complete and 
non-fraudulent water Supply/Demand Study" (First "Cause of Action," R. at 24); (ii) the 
Court should "mandatorily order the [the Administrative Defendants] to perform their 
obligations under Ordinance No. 436" by "rejecting] Mountain Regional^ Water 
Concurrency Submission as being inaccurate," by "requiring] that Mountain Regional file 
a true and accurate water concurrency Supply/Demand Study," and by first recommending 
and then ordering "an audit of Mountain Regional as provided for in Ordinance No. 436" 
(Second "Cause of Action," R. at 25); and (3) the Court should "mandatorily order the 
[County Commissioner] Richer to produce the Report and analysis of William Brown" 
(Third "Cause of Action," R. at 26.) 
MRSSD and the Administrative Defendants moved to dismiss Summit Water's 
Complaint on the grounds that Rule 65B provided no basis for the relief sought. (R. at 
97-100.) Defendants argued that mandamus was not appropriate because Summit Water 
had other plain, speedy and adequate remedies specified by the Ordinance and § 17-27-
1001; and pursuant to these remedies Summit Water's Complaint was untimely, having 
been filed June 26, 2003, some 114 days after MRSSD and the Administrative Defendants 
had taken the challenged actions. (R. at 097-0125). 
In response, Summit Water made essentially two arguments: First, Summit Water 
made the argument it now advances on appeal (albeit in a different form) and contended 
that Ordinance 436 "involves the regulation and supervision of water companies within 
the county and does not 'regulate land use,3" so CLUDMA had no application to its 
Complaint. (R. at 164-67.) Second, Summit Water contended that its Complaint actually 
alleged "violations" of Ordinance 436, rather than challenging decisions rendered pursuant 
to the ordinance, and was thus proper under CLUDMA's provisions allowing actions for 
injunctive relief to redress violations of the Act. (R. at 165-77.) 
The district court heard oral arguments on the motions, and issued a Memorandum 
Decision and Order granting the motions to dismiss. (R. at 232.) As for Summit Water's 
first argument, the court started with an analysis of Ordinance 436, and found that it 
"speaks in terms of water availability and growth and demand, and the need to protect the 
public and watch over development as it relates to water usage." (R. at 235.) Thus the 
court concluded: "The Court believes this was a land use decision . . . [and] fits within 
the ambit of CLUDMA." (R. at 236.) The court went on to reject Summit Water's 
arguments that it was seeking injunctive relief to redress "violations" of the Ordinance, 
instead of decisions made pursuant to it, stating in pertinent part: 
Here, the county officials did "decide" something. That is, they decided to 
accept the submission of MRSSD and they acted on that submission. If that 
decision was based on information that was not true, it was still a decision. . . . 
The court cannot escape that conclusion. Plaintiff asserts that the engineer did not 
decide anything, but violated his duty by not fully investigating the submission. 
Even if true, the allegation leads the court to the conclusion that the engineer still 
"decided" to pass the submission on to the health director. If that decision was 
"wrong" was it a decision that was not in the "exercise of the provisions" of 
CLUDMA? The court is not finding Toone or Culbertson helpful in answering 
this question. The court . . . believes on balance either a statutory scheme exists to 
deal with such matters, or every action by a county is subject to such requests as 
plaintiff makes in this case if there is an allegation that the material submitted was 
false or misleading. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is not to be used 
when there is another remedy 
. . . The effect of plaintiffs demand, if granted, would be for this court to 
tell the Summit County Engineer to require MRSSD to resubmit a concurrency 
report, evaluate it again, and pass it on to the health director again. If an opponent 
to that submission requested, the court could be asked to demand the process be 
repeated again, seemingly without end. 
(R. at 237-38.) 
Summit Water now appeals the district court's decision. On appeal, iStunmit Water 
has abandoned arguments that its Complaint sought to redress "violations" of 
Ordinance 436, so as not to be time barred under other provisions of CLUDMA (as well 
as its argument that Defendants should be mandatorily enjoined to provide Summit Water 
with certain documents), thereby implicitly conceding that if Ordinance 436 is authorized 
by CLUDMA, the district court's order of dismissal was correct. Rather, Summit Water 
now asserts only that "Ordinance No. 436 is not a land use ordinance and could not have 
been promulgated pursuant to any authority granted to Summit County by the State of 
Utah under CLUDMA." Appellants3 Br. at p. 9. See dso id. at pp. 11-19. For this 
reason, Summit Water argues, the district court erred in applying CLUDMA's time and 
standard of review limitations to Summit Water's Complaint. Id. 
B. Reply to Appellants3 Statement of Facts. 
Consistent with standards applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, the 
district court, MRSSD and the Administrative Defendants assumed for the limited 
purposes of the court's rulings only that the facts alleged in Summit Water's Amended 
Complaint were true.4 (R. at 236.) Summit Water now emphasizes those facts in its 
brief, to the exclusion of others. Appellants3 Br. at pp. 4-9. However, the facts material 
to the district court's decision to dismiss Summit Water's Complaint are those facts 
evidencing the legislative findings, purpose and effect of Ordinance 436, and those 
demonstrating the timing and effect of the decisions attacked by Summit Water's 
Complaint. Those facts are all summarized in Appellees' description of the,nature of the 
case and course of proceedings as set forth above.5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Summit Water's sole argument on appeal, that CLUDMA does not provide 
authorization for Ordinance 436 and thus CLUDMA's time and standard of review 
limitations do not apply, does not begin or end with an analysis of CLUDMA's enabling 
language. That language provides, in pertinent part, that: "to provide for the health, 
safety, and welfare . . . counties may enact all ordinances, resolutions, and rules that they 
consider necessary for the use and development of land within the county. . . . " Utah 
Code Ann. § 17-27-102. 
Pursuant to this enabling language, the relevant inquiry Summit Water does not 
even address is whether, in order to provide for the common welfare, the County 
4Appellees in fact vigorously contest the "opprobrious epithets of malice" and 
allegations of even criminal conduct which literally permeate Summit Water's pleadings 
and papers on appeal. 
5Appellees point out that a description of the legislative findings supporting the 
Ordinance is included in the Ordinance itself, which is, in turn, attached as an exhibit to 
Summit Water's Complaint and incorporated by reference. (R. at 9, 27-52.) These facts 
are thus properly considered on review of the district court's order of dismissal pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6), and on this appeal, which presents legal issues of statutory and ordinance 
interpretation. 
considered Ordinance 436 necessary for land use and development. Without any dispute 
or even allegation to the contrary the legislative record before the Court establishes that 
the County did consider the regulations imposed by the Ordinance, including those 
regulations impacting water companies operating in the County to be necessary to, and 
intimately connected with, land use and development. 
This is so despite the fact that the Ordinance does require the Administrative 
Defendants to evaluate all water companies5 water rights, storage capacities, system 
demands, and other water-related functions in order to assess the companies' actual ability 
to deliver water to developments, and despite the fact that the state might also impose 
comprehensive but not co-extensive regulations. In short, when CLUDMA's plain and 
unambiguous enabling language is applied to the legislative findings of the Board of 
County Commissioners and the express terms of the Ordinance itself, there is no question 
Ordinance 436 was enacted under authority granted by CLUDMA. Summit Water's 
arguments to the contrary here border on frivolity. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUMMIT WATER'S ARGUMENT THAT ORDINANCE 436 WAS 
NOT ENACTED UNDER AUTHORITY GRANTED BY CLUDMA 
IS WITHOUT BASIS IN FACT OR IN LAW. 
Summit Water's sole assertion on appeal is that because Ordinance 436 purports to 
regulate water companies, it was not promulgated under any authority given Summit 
County by CLUDMA, and so the district court erred in applying CLUDMA's time and 
standard of review limitations to Summit Water's Complaint. Appellants3 Br. at pp. 11-
19. But Summit Water's arguments purporting to support this proposition do not bear 
analysis. 
Summit Water first contends that CLUDMA does not provide authority for 
Ordinance 436 because "[i]n essence, the Ordinance is water, not land use, regulation.53 
*Id. at 13. In doing so, Summit Water lists certain water-related elements which the 
Ordinance requires the Administrative Defendants to evaluate in order to verify whether a 
water company actually has the current and future ability to deliver wet water to 
development within the County. Appellants5 Br. at pp. 12-13 (the Ordinance gives the 
Administrative Defendants authority to review "water rights, water source capacity, reserve 
source capacity . . . outstanding commitment/board/service letters and other system 
demands,55 etc.). 
The relevant inquiry under CLUDMA, however, is not what or whom the 
Ordinance might collaterally effect, but whether Summit County "considered] [the 
Ordinance] necessary for the use and development of land within the county.55 Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-27-102 ("counties may enact all ordinances, resolutions, and rules that they 
consider necessary for the use and development of land within the county.55). Summit 
Water wholly fails to address what the Summit County Commission "considered55 in 
enacting the Ordinance and how those considerations related to land use and development 
in the County. 
In fact, as noted above, the Summit County Commission made specific legislative 
findings reflecting its consideration that the availability of water through water companies 
with a verified ability to deliver actual wet water was important to and intimately 
connected with land use and development in the County. In pertinent part, those findings 
were that: drought had caused water system failures affecting the ability to provide 
adequate water service to existing connections or to permit new connections; water 
shortages had been caused by poor water management decisions, and by well failures and 
other causes reasonably beyond the control of management; water shortages could have 
been lessened by interconnection of systems and a management vehicle to facilitate the 
sharing of available surplus water resources; neither the Utah State Division of Drinking 
Water ("DDW") nor the County had previously provided more than an initial feasibility 
review of water companies's systems and appurtenances, and neither the State nor the 
County were doing continuing periodic monitoring to ensure the various water companies 
had an ongoing ability to meet service demands; new development should not occur unless 
the water company supplying development could demonstrate the ability to provide water 
to the development; and building permits should not issue for new construction unless the 
physical water supply then currendy existed to serve the new connection, and an 
irrevocable commitment for service was given by a water company to protect the property 
owner's ability to obtain water service and to preserve the marketability of the property. 
(R. at 27-29.) 
And based on these findings, the structure of the Ordinance itself reflects the 
County's consideration that the Ordinance was necessary for land use and development. 
On its face, the ordinance is, inter alia: "An Ordinance Providing for the Establishment of 
Zoning Regulations Regulating the Approval of Subdivision Plats and Building Permits in 
the Snyderville Basin Planning District of Summit County53 (R. at 27.) To that end, and 
as set forth above, Ordinance 436 requires that: (i) before a developer receives plat 
approval or building permits from the County, the developer have a letter issued from a 
water company within the county indicating the water company's willingness and 
commitment to supply water (R. at 38-40); and (ii) water companies supplying 
development within the County submit an annual Supply/Demand Study and five-year 
forecast so that the County could assess the validity of the letters and the water companies3 
actual ability to supply water pursuant to them. (R. at 42-48.) 
Summit Water completely ignores these legislative findings or any analysis of the 
structure of the Ordinance, and certainly provides no allegation or evidence to dispute 
them. However, the Court is required to give deference and a presumption of validity to 
these findings and the Ordinance they support. See, e.g., Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 
358 P.2d 633, 636 (Utah 1961): 
From the fact that [the county commissioners] hold such public offices it is to be 
assumed that they have wide knowledge of the various conditions and activities in 
the county bearing on the question of proper zoning, such as the location of 
businesses, schools, roads and traffic conditions, growth in population and housing, 
the capacity of utilities, the existing classification of surrounding property, and the 
effect that the proposed reclassification may have on these things and upon the 
general orderly development of the county. . . . In zoning, as in any legislative 
action, the functioning authority has wide discretion. Its action is endowed with a 
presumption of validity; and it is the court's duty to resolve all doubts in favor 
thereof and not to interfere with the Commission's action unless it clearly appears 
to be beyond its power; or is unconstitutional for some such reason as it deprives 
one of property without due process of law, or capriciously and arbitrarily infringes 
upon his rights therein, or is unjusdy discriminatory. The burden was upon the 
plaintiff to show that the Commission's action was suffused with one or more of 
those faults, which burden has not been sustained. . . . Under such circumstances 
it was not the prerogative of the court to substitute its judgment for that of the 
Commission. 
(Emphasis added.) See also Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 410 P.2d 764, 765-66 (Utah 
1966) ("the court will not invade the province of the Commission and substitute its 
judgment therefor; nor will it interfere with the prerogatives of the Commission unless it 
is shown to be so clearly in error that there is no reasonable basis whatsoever to justify it 
and its action must therefore be regarded as capricious and arbitrary."); 
Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass'n v. Engh Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150 (Utah 
1976) (exercise of zoning power is a legislative function to be exercised by the legislative 
bodies of municipalities; the wisdom of a zoning plan, its necessity and the nature and 
boundaries of the zoned district are all matters within the legislative discretion; and 
Supreme Court will avoid substituting its judgment for that of the zoning authority). 
In light of the County's public policy goals and objectives as demonstrated in the 
findings and provisions of the Ordinance, the district court correcdy found that Ordinance 
436 is designed to insure there is water available for land use and development in the 
County, and is thus authorized by CLUDMA. (R. at 235-36.) The Court need trouble 
no further with Summit Water's unsupported, and essentially immaterial, characterization 
that "[i]n essence, the Ordinance is water, not land use, regulation." Appellants' Br. at p. 
13. 
Summit Water goes on to argue that because the State Engineer and State 
Department of Drinking Water are charged with regulating certain aspects of water rights 
and use, the Court should not read CLUDMA to authorize Ordinance 436 "for the simple 
reason that such regulation is already carried out and overseen by the State of Utah and is 
not a function delegated to the counties." Appellants3 Br. at 17-18. Again, Summit 
Water's argument is completely unsupported by CLUDMA or the ordinance at issue. 
As it did in making its first argument, Summit Water ignores CLUDMA's enabling 
language: "counties may enact all ordinances, resolutions, and rules that they consider 
necessary for the use and development of land within the county.53 Utah Code Ann. § 17-
27-102. And again, Summit Water fails to see that the relevant inquiry is not what other 
or additional regulation may also exist, but whether Summit County considered the 
Ordinance necessary for land use and development in the County As set forth above, it is 
undisputed that despite the existence of the "comprehensive" State water regulations which 
Summit Water takes such pains to detail, the County's legislative body found, among 
other things, that there was no mechanism in place at the state or county level to monitor 
water companies' ability to provide actual wet water to development other than an initial 
feasibility review, and based on those findings the County did consider the Ordinance 
necessary for land use and development. (R. at 27-29.) 
In light of the enabling legislation and specific legislative findings, there is 
absolutely no basis to conclude that the mere existence of other state water regulations is 
reason to read CLUDMA as not "authoriz[ing]" Ordinance 436. In fact, the County's 
legislative body has found a need for Ordinance 436 with respect to water companies 
suppling development, and acted to meet that need, and the existence of state regulation is 
wholly immaterial to the County's authority under CLUDMA. 
Summit Water finally reaches the language of CLUDMA itself, and goes on to 
argue that "[n]othing under CLUDMA authorizes the type of comprehensive regulation of 
water and water companies provided under Ordinance No. 436." Appellants' Br. at p. 18. 
But again, Summit Water fails to analyze CLUDMA's enabling language in relation to the 
considerations giving rise to the Ordinance. 
Contrary to Summit Water's characterization that "CLUDMA is quite specific in its 
grant of authority" (Appellants' Br. at p. 15), CLUDMA's grant of authority is actually 
extremely broad. See, e.g., Adam Strachan, Concurrency Laws: Water as a Land Use 
Regulation, 21 J. Land, Resources & Envtl. Law at 451-52 (noting that authority for 
Summit County's concurrency ordinances comes from § 17-27-401, and stating that 
"plaintiffs seeking to challenge Summit County's concurrency ordinance should look 
beyond zoning or police power arguments . . . . " ) . Section 17-27-102 provides in 
pertinent part that: "to provide for the health, safety and welfare, . . . counties may enact 
all ordinances, resolutions, and rules that they consider necessary for the use and 
development of land within the county . . . .55 Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-102.6 
Thus, under CLUDMA's enabling language, it is necessary only that in order to 
provide for the common welfare, the County considered Ordinance 436 necessary for land 
use and development. As already discussed above, the County indisputably did so, and 
Summit Water's analysis wholly fails to even address the public policy goals and objectives 
related to land use and development specifically described in the legislative findings of the 
County's legislative body. Summit Water has given neither this Court nor the court below 
any basis to second guess the County on this issue, and the district court correctly 
determined that Ordinance 436 is authorized by CLUDMA. Compare Cherokee Water & 
Sanitation Dist. v. El Paso County. 770 P.2d 1339 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (addressing a 
four pronged attack on an ordinance requiring 300-year water supply for subdivision 
approval, and concluding that cc[f]ar from being ultra vires, the amendment to the 
regulations was adopted as an attempted implementation of the state statute pertaining to 
subdivision regulations . . . [and] [t]he county acted well within its bounds in adopting 
the regulation in question.53). 
6In addition, § 17-27-104 provides that " . . . counties may enact ordinances 
imposing stricter requirements or higher standards than are required by this chapter.55 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-104(1). And § 17-27-401 provides that cc[t]he legislative body 
may enact a zoning ordinance establishing regulations for land use and development that 
furthers the intent of this chapter.55 Utah Code Ann. §17-27-401. Finally, § 17-27-302 
provides that the County may adopt a general plan that "provide[s] for: . . . the efficient 
and economical use, conservation, and production of the supply of: . . . food and water . 
. . ,
55
 Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-302. 
Finally contrary to Summit Water's misplaced reliance, Toone v. Weber County 
2002 UT 103, 57 P.3d 1079, neither addresses the issue nor implies Ordinance 436 is not 
authorized by CLUDMA. In Toone, the Court simply noted that: 
Plaintiffs do not challenge a land use decision made in the exercise of the provisions 
of CLUDMA but instead assail Weber County's failure to follow certain procedural 
requirements contained therein, which were triggered by its intent to sell land. 
Toone. 2002 UT 103 11 10, 57 P3d 1079 (emphasis added). In the context of an alleged 
failure to comply with procedural requirements prior to the sale of surplus property, the 
Court observed: 
Section 17-27-1001 does not apply . . . where a party seeks relief from a county's 
violation of the provisions of CLUDMA because a county's failure to follow the 
procedures mandated by CLUDMA is not a "land use decision" made under 
CLUDMA. 
Id at 11 8. 
Toone is not applicable here because Summit Water does not allege the County 
failed to follow procedures mandated by CLUDMA in adopting Ordinance 436 as 
plaintiffs did in Toone. or even that MRSSD or the Administrative Defendants failed to 
follow procedural steps outlined by Ordinance 436. Quite to the contrary, as the district 
court correcdy noted, Summit Water's Complaint is a collateral attack on decisions actually 
made under an ordinance passed pursuant to CLUDMA. Toone is simply inapposite. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED SUMMIT 
WATER'S COMPLAINT SEEKING MANDAMUS RELIEF 
BECAUSE SUMMIT WATER HAD OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY 
AND ADEQUATE REMEDIES. 
Summit Water's Complaint was brought pursuant to "Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
65B(a) & (d)" (R. at 3), which provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate 
remedy is available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary' relief on any 
of the grounds set forth in paragraph . . . (d) (involving the wrongful use of 
judicial authority, the failure to exercise such authority, and actions by the Board of 
Pardons and Parole). 
(d) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty; actions by 
board of pardons and parole. 
(d)(2) Grounds for relief Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an 
inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions has 
exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior court, 
administrative agency, corporation or person has failed to perform an act required 
by law as a duty of office, trust or station; (C) where an inferior court, 
administrative agency, corporation or person has refused the petitioner the use or 
enjoyment of a right or office to which the petitioner is entided; or (D) where the 
Board of Pardons and Parole has exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to perform an 
act required by constitutional or statutory law. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a),(d).7 
7Mandamus is a drastic remedy appropriate only in extraordinary circumstances. 
Brantley Farms v. Carlsbad Irr. Dist.. 954 P.2d 763, 768 (N.M. App. 1998). Mandamus 
is available only when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 65B (a person may petition for extraordinary relief "[w]here no other plain, speedy and 
adequate remedy is available"). 
Assuming Ordinance 436 was enacted pursuant to CLUDMA, Summit Water 
implicidy concedes it had other plain, speedy and adequate remedies besides mandamus. 
Specifically, it had the peer review process provided by Ordinance 436 itself,8 and the 
petition for review process provided by § 17-27-1001. The district court correctly 
dismissed Summit Water's Complaint because by ignoring the remedies provided by the 
Ordinance and § 17-27-1001, Summit Water placed itself beyond the reach of the 
extraordinary remedy of mandamus. See, e.g., Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., 392 
P.2d 40 (Utah 1964) (upholding dismissal of action to enjoin the issuance of a building 
permit which allegedly violated county ordinances for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies or petition for review); Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning 
Common, 659 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah 1983) ("By ignoring a plain, speedy, and adequate 
remedy at law, the plaintiffs placed themselves out of reach of the extraordinary writ of 
mandamus"); Hatch v. Utah County Planning Dep't., 685 P.2d 550 (Utah 
1984)(refusing to review mandamus challenge to denial of building permit).9 
It is perhaps worth noting that: (a) Summit Water does not dispute the county 
had authority for Ord. 436 under other provisions of state law (Appellants5 Br. at pp. 18-
19), and (b) there are administrative remedies in the ordinance itself, in the form of a peer 
review process, separate and distinct from the petition for review process provided by 
CLUDMA. Thus even assuming Summit Water were correct in asserting that CLUDMA 
did not provide authority for the ordinance, which it is not, Summit Water still failed to 
avail itself of the plain, speedy and adequate remedies provided by the ordinance, and 
mandamus is inappropriate. 
9These holdings are consistent with the very nature of mandamus relief, which 
serves to compel the performance of a nondiscretionary duty and to "compel action, when 
refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of 
judgment or discretion in a particular way.33 State v. Ruggeri, 429 P.2d 969, 970 (Utah 
1967) (emphasis added). Mandamus is intended "to compel a person to perform a legal 
duty incumbent on him by virtue of his office or as required by law." Renn v. Utah State 
Bd. of Pardons. 904 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah 1995). As the Supreme Court noted in Wright 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Appellees respectfully requests this Court's Order 
upholding die district court's dismissal of Summit Water's Complaint, no cause of action. 
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Development v. City of Wellsville. 608 P.2d 232 (Utah 1980): 
The action of the district court reflects a correct understanding and application of 
the basic principles relating to the extraordinary writ oi mandamus: that its purpose 
is not for the courts to intrude into or interfere with the functions or the policies of 
other departments of government. Accordingly where the action sought is a 
matter of discretion, the court may require the public body (or public official) to 
act, but will not substitute its judgment for that of the public body by telling it 
how it must decide; and when it has so acted the courts will not interfere therewith 
unless the determination made is in violation of substantial rights, or is so totally 
discordant to reason and justice that its action must be deemed capricious and 
arbitrary. 
608 P.2d at 233-34 (footnote omitted)(emphasis added). 
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ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM 
County Land Use Development and Management Act, Utah Code Annotated §§ 17-27-
101, 17-27-102, 17-27-1001(2)(a): 
17-27-101. Short tide. 
This chapter shall be known as the "County Land Use Development 
and Management Act." 
17-27-102. Purpose. 
(1) To accomplish the purpose of this chapter, and in Order to 
provide for the health, safety, and welfare, and promote the prosperity, 
improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort, convenience, and 
aesthetics of the county and its present and future inhabitants and businesses, 
to protect the tax base, secure economy in governmental expenditures, foster 
the state's agricultural and other industries, protect both urban and non 
urban development, and to protect property values, counties may enact all 
ordinances, resolutions, and rules that they consider necessary for the use 
and development of land within the county, including ordinances, 
resolutions, and rules governing uses, density, open spaces, structures, 
buildings, energy-efficiency, light and air, air quality, transportation and 
public or alternative transportation, infrastructure, public facilities, 
vegetation, and trees and landscaping, unless those ordinances, resolutions, 
or rules are expressly prohibited by law. 
17-27-301. General plan. 
(1) In order to accomplish the purposes set forth in this chapter, 
each county shall prepare and adopt a comprehensive general plan for: 
(a) the present and future needs of the county; and 
(b) the growth and development of the land within the county 
or any part of the county, including uses of land for urbanization, 
trade, industry, residential, agricultural, wildlife habitat, and other 
purposes. 
(2) The plan may provide for: 
(a) health, general welfare, safety energy conservation, 
transportation, prosperity, civic activities, aesthetics, and recreational, 
educational, and cultural opportunities; 
(b) the reduction of the waste of physical, financial, or human 
resources that result from either excessive congestion or excessive 
scattering of population; 
(c) the efficient and economical use, conservation, and 
production of the supply of: 
(i) food and water; and 
17-27-401. General powers. 
The legislative body may enact a zoning ordinance establishing 
regulations for land use and development that furthers the intent of this 
chapter. 
17-27-1001. Appeals. 
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the 
exercise of or in violation of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition 
for review of the decision with the district court within 30 days after the 
local decision is rendered. 
(3) (a) The courts shall: 
(i) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and 
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal. 
(b) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the 
decision violates a statute, ordinance, or existing law. 
Rule 65B(a), (c) and (d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is 
available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief on any of the 
grounds set forth in paragraph (b) (involving wrongful restraint on personal 
liberty), paragraph (c) (involving the wrongful use of public or corporate authority) 
or paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of judicial authority, the failure to 
exercise such authority, and actions by the Board of Pardons and Parole). There 
shall be no special form of writ. Except for instances governed by Rule 65C, the 
procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings on all petitions for extraordinary 
relief. To the extent that this rule does not provide special procedures, proceedings 
on petitions for extraordinary relief shall be governed by the procedures set forth 
elsewhere in these rules. 
(d) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty; actions by 
board of pardons and parole. 
(d)(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are 
threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph may petition the court 
for relief. 
(d)(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an 
inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions has 
exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior court, 
administrative agency, corporation or person has failed to perform an act required 
by law as a duty of office, trust or station; (C) where an inferior court, 
administrative agency, corporation or person has refused the petitioner the use or 
enjoyment of a right or office to which the petitioner is entitled; or (D) where the 
Board of Pardons and Parole has exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to perform an 
act required by constitutional or statutory law. 
(d)(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may 
require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or 
may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on 
the merits. The court may direct the inferior court, administrative agency, officer, 
corporation or other person named as respondent to deliver to the court a 
transcript or other record of the proceedings. The court may also grant temporary 
relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65 A. 
(d)(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in 
nature, the court's review shall not extend further than to determine whether the 
respondent has regularly pursued its authority 
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